

SECRET

419

26 July 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: PB I
SUBJECT: British Counterpart of BGFIEND

This is the British plan "Valuable", counterpart of our plan BGFIEND. I believe that it belongs in the PB I files.

C S J
Chief, Planning Support Staff

TJB:mes

Enclosure: 1
British Plan "Valuable"

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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DATE 2007

SECRET

ALBANIAN OPERATIONAL

PLAN

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ALBANIAN PLAN

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INTENTION

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- a) To infiltrate into southern Albania agents recruited from the refugee supporters of the BALLI KOMBATER MOVEMENT in Greece, and possibly Italy. These agents to make contact with sympathisers in Albania, ascertain their willingness to engage in S.O. and test the degree of substance behind their assurances by mounting preliminary operations on a very small scale.
- b) If the results obtained by this fighting reconnaissance are satisfactory to develop operations aimed against the communications and supply bases of the Communist guerilla forces engaged in North Greece on a sufficient scale effectively to supplement the action of the Greek Army and to limit, if not entirely deny, the refuge and facilities which the guerillas have hitherto enjoyed on Albanian soil.

METHOD.

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To form 4 - 6 infiltration parties each consisting of 2-3 men recruited from among BALLI KOMBATER refugee groups. These parties will be each directed to centres in Southern Albania where it is known or hoped that B.K. supporters are numerous. They will each be equipped with radio communications and will be supplied with money and a quantity of arms (ex-Italian origin, if thought necessary). They will be briefed to make contact with the movement in their allotted areas and to report such success or failure as they may experience by radio telephony.

BRIEF

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The brief for their approach to B.K. leaders will be roughly as follows:-

"They have been despatched as emissaries of the British, who are willing to supply local bands of guerillas with money and arms if in return those guerillas will carry out attacks on the facilities and communications which the Communist Greeks enjoy in southern Albania. As evidence of their good faith and intentions the British have supplied them with gold for the initial stages and a token supply of arms which the emissaries have either brought with them or cached near their point of landing.

If the B.K. leaders are willing to take action in return for this British support they should

- a) Transmit through the medium of the emissaries W/T all available intelligence regarding Greek Communist activities and the support they receive on Albanian territory.
- b) Their local leader or head man should prepare himself for exfiltration at a pre-arranged rendez-vous in order that he may receive the necessary instructions and hold discussions with the British regarding his requirements."

It is not intended at this stage to enter into any form of internal political discussions or to make any promises regarding future British intentions. At a later stage, if we prove successful and the B.K. grow in strength it is highly probable that such questions will arise. It is suggested, however, that this bridge shall be crossed when it is reached.

/Each

Each infiltration party will be supplied with a pre-determined rendez-vous for their own exfiltration or for the exfiltration of B.K. leaders. Such exfiltration operations to take place approximately two months after entry into the country.

It is considered that in the initial stages the anti-Greek nature of the task which we wish the B.K. to perform as also the supply of finance and token arms, should be sufficient incentive for them to take action in accordance with our own wishes.

The above may be considered as the fighting reconnaissance stage of the plan and it is difficult to envisage its further development until this reconnaissance has actually occurred.

Of the six infiltrated parties we may expect at the best, 3 or 4 to return with some form of constructive results. It is then that we shall be able to enter stage two which will consist of the infiltration of increased supplies of sabotage and guerilla equipment and the direction of the guerilla attacks against known targets which will come to our knowledge as a result of the reconnaissance carried out in stage one.

COMMUNICATIONS

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A main communications base should be established on CORFU. Should this be used exclusively for W/T purposes. A fairly secure form of cover could be arranged, i.e. W/T link for British Military Mission to GREECE, meteorological station, B.O.A.C. aircraft W/T base for ATHENS route, etc. The purpose of this base would be to maintain communications with:-

- a) H.O. LONDON
- b) Training and operational base
- c) parties in the field.

For the purpose of a) and b) normal B.2 sets should prove adequate, although should the base permit, an even more reliable set for this purpose could be installed. For the purpose of c), B.3 radio telephonic sets would be required. Sets for this purpose are available and are undergoing user trials. The use of these sets will obviate the training of Albanian wireless operators in morse. They are moderately handy sets with their own pedal generating plant which can be carried for short distances as a pack and for longer distances by ass or mule. They will provide direct telephonic speech between parties in the field and the base on CORFU, and, provided suitable location is found, maintain communications over a range from 10 to 60 or 70 miles. User trials may result in greater ranges. Should deep penetration of ALBANIA prove desirable, communications might be maintained with further - most parties by the use of repeater stations, i.e. furthestmost party A. would transmit a message by radio-telephone to nearer party B., who, in turn would repeat to base.

PREPARATORY ACTION.

- a) User trials for B.3 should be concluded.
- b) Discussions should be held with S.C.1 to determine the types of set most suitable for the base station and operational base.
- c) Sets to be earmarked, tested and if necessary, prepared for shipment.

ADVANCE BASE - CORFU

PURPOSE.

To act as an advance country section base and communications centre for the relay of information received from the field parties to LONDON and the operational base.

PERSONNEL.

- a) 2 country section officers.
- b) 3 W/T operators (1 officer, 2 other ranks)- British.
- c) 3 telephonists - Albanian.
- d) 1 codist - male, British.

Ancillary staff such as cooks, cleaners etc. to be recruited locally, or from among trustworthy Greeks from the mainland.

Although the training and mounting of operations to ALBANIA will be the responsibility of the operational base in the rear, the CORFU station will have the need for country section officers in order that tactical guidance may be given direct to the field, and that the operational base may be able to maintain contact with the field parties through trustworthy British officers who are kept fully informed.

The possibility of maintaining communications with four or more field parties, as also with LONDON and the operational base, will demand an almost continual wireless watch, for which purpose three British operators will be required. Owing to the technical nature of the wireless sets it is probable that field communications will be most favourably maintained during the hours of daylight. This factor might reduce to two our requirement for Albanian operators at the communications base. This, however, does not affect the necessity to recruit at least three Albanians for this purpose thus giving us the necessary margin for wastage.

ACCOMMODATION.

It is estimated that one large house should be sufficient for this purpose. If, however, such cannot be found, then two or three smaller houses should meet our requirement. The possibility of obtaining accommodation in CORFU has not yet been investigated. Should difficulties arise, it may be necessary to think in the terms of nissen huts.

TRANSPORT.

1 jeep.

SUPPLIES.

As far as possible supplies will be obtained by local purchase but these will most probably require to be supplemented by deliveries, using sea transport, from the mainland or the operational base, (see special note).

Special Note. As operations develop the CORFU base will undoubtedly form an advanced unit of the operational base. It may well prove necessary that caiques proceeding from the operational base

/to the Albanian

to the Albanian coast for the infiltration of agents may wish to establish contact with the advance base, either by W/T or by actually putting in to an inlet on CORFU, in order that they may receive the latest operational intelligence from the field, or last minute instructions from their own base. It is therefore suggested that the CORFU base should either have its own sea transport in the form of a motor-caique or launch, or that there should be frequent caique traffic with the base under the cover of delivering supplies, in order that the visit of an operational caique may not cause comment or give rise to suspicion.

It is estimated that the establishment of this base should be possible within one month after the preliminary reconnaissance.

PREPARATORY ACTION.

A reconnaissance to be made on CORFU by a fully briefed officer in order to ascertain the feasibility of the above suggestions and to make such proposals as may be necessary after modification.

MAIN BASE - MALTA

LOCATION.

The nature of this establishment necessitates that the base should be located on British or British held territory, and it is proposed that the most suitable position would be on the island of MALTA. The only other alternatives are the North African coast in the region of BENGHAZI, or upon the island of CYPRUS. Both of these are unsuitable; CYPRUS for security reasons and the fact that it is approximately 1,000 miles from the CORFU forward base; and BENGHAZI is disadvantageous from the point of view of maintenance and also is over 500 miles from CORFU.

The island of MALTA is undoubtedly the most favourable location from every point of view.

PURPOSE.

The main base will be used in the following capacities:-

- a) As a training centre.
- b) As a holding station.
- c) As a caique base.
- d) As an operational base.
- e) As an arms and material dump.
- f) As a communications link.

Training Centre.

After recruitment it is proposed that Albanian personnel should be despatched to MALTA where they would receive certain elementary para-military training in the use of weapons and in general guerilla tactics. No extensive training would be required in view of the fact that the Albanians have a greater knowledge of guerilla activity in their own country than we ourselves. They will also require training for their W/T role, and this is estimated for field parties to be of maximum one month's duration and could run concurrently with their general training.

Holding Station.

After training it would be necessary to form trainees into operational groups and to provide some form of holding unit in which each group, with the aid of maps, etc., works out in detail its own operational commitment and prepares itself for the infiltration operation.

Caique Base.

It is estimated that two caiques will be required in the initial stage. Should, however, the reconnaissance at this stage prove successful, the caique demand would be increased to a maximum of three to four.

Operational Base.

Under this heading falls the detailed planning of each individual operation resultant upon intelligence gained from the field, the preparation of the operators and their despatch by caique. This

/should not prove

should not prove to be a heavy commitment except in the latter stages when large quantities of material may have to be dealt with.

Arms and Material Dump.

It will be necessary to establish a dump for arms and material. During the reconnaissance stage this commitment will not be heavy; guarded magazine facilities would however be required. In the further stages it might be necessary to establish our own arms magazines for the preparation of weapons and material into special packs suitable for caches or mule transport.

Communications Link.

The base at MALTA will be required to maintain contact by W/T with the forward base at CORFU and with Head Office.

PERSONNEL.

It is estimated that the personnel requirement of the MALTA base will be as follows:-

- a) 2 country section officers - One to act as commander of both the main base and the advance base on CORFU, and to be responsible to LONDON for the conduct of the whole operation. The second country section officer would be second in command and responsible for admin and general coordination of training, operations etc.
- b) 1 training officer as commandant of the training and holding schools for the Albanian personnel, assisted by Albanian instructor personnel. It is suggested that the first training commitment should be to select and train a first class Albanian instructor, thus relieving the training officer of detailed work coupled with language difficulties.
- c) 1 W/T instructor will be required for the preparation of Albanians in radio telephony.

Note. In view of the limited training to be given on guerilla activity, as also that only a short course in RT with little or no technical instruction will be required for the W/T operators, it may be possible to combine the general training and W/T instructor in one and the same British officer, or alternatively, in view of the fact that British signals personnel will be required to maintain the station, this training commitment could be carried out by them in addition to their other signals duties.

- d) 1 operations officer. It is suggested that one operations officer will be required, and for this the most suitable would be a N.O. with wartime experience of the caique flotilla operating in the Eastern Mediterranean.
- e) Communications. A chief signals officer will be required, who would be responsible for the maintenance of the signals station at MALTA, as also in command over the advance base establishment in CORFU. He would require 2 W/T other ranks to maintain signals watch.

The ancillary staff cannot be dealt with in this outline plan for this would be dependant upon those facilities which we may be able to obtain from both army and naval establishments on the island.

/Accommodation.

ACCOMMODATION.

There should be sufficient ex Army, RAF accommodation on the island which could be requisitioned for our purposes and the necessary accommodation should not prove difficult.

TRANSPORT.

Land. 2 jeeps or 4-seater vehicles will be required, as also probably 1 15 cwt truck for the transport of stores from dumps to caique loading points.

SUPPLIES.

These will be shipped in bulk from U.K. and should present little difficulty. Rationing could be arranged by the attachment of the unit to an existant naval or army establishment, or by local purchase.

PREPARATORY ACTION.

To despatch an officer to make a reconnaissance covering all the above mentioned functions of the station. Most probably the best method of carrying this out would be through close liaison and with the assistance of the D.S.O. or the S.I.O on the island.

MATERIAL

This section deals exclusively with material which will be required for the support of operations in ALBANIA, and makes no attempt at dealing with communications and other equipment necessary for the main base MALTA, or the advance base CORFU.

WEAPONS.

It is estimated that in the initial stages the following fighting weapons will be required for despatch to MALTA:-

- a) 50 stens.
- b) 250 light carbines.
- c) 200 hand grenades.

AMMUNITION.

- a) 2,000 rounds sten gun ammunition.
- b) 60,000 rounds carbine ammunition.

OTHER DEVICES.

- a) 100 road mines.
- b) 100 tyre bursters (camouflage mule dung).
- c) 10 standard sabotage packs.

From the above material it should be possible to provide the initial parties with the token supplies of arms mentioned in Section (METHOD).

The further build-up of arms is again entirely dependant upon the degree of success achieved during the initial stage. It is, however, considered that at no time would the dump at the operational base consist of a greater number of weapons than would be required for the support of 500 guerillas.

FINANCE

It is estimated that the total financial commitment involved in the fighting reconnaissance and Stage 2. i.e. support of an effective guerilla force in ALBANIA, will be somewhere in the neighbourhood of £350/500,000 to cover the whole period of effective action. To form a more accurate picture than is given by the above generalization, the following breakdown may be envisaged:-

FIRST SIX MONTHS.

Advance Base CORFU £25,000

This sum to cover accommodation, salaries, equipment, W/T supplies and transport.

Main Base MALTA £25,000

This sum to cover salaries, weapons for Albanians, training expenses, accommodation, maintenance, etc.

Note. Compared with the figure for the base at CORFU, this sum may appear to be too conservative. Allowances have however been made in the expectation that considerable facilities may be obtained in MALTA from Service sources outside our own vote.

Operations £20,000

It is estimated that the sum of £20,000 will be required for operational purposes. This will include gold for infiltration with the operational parties, payment for initial operational stores, costs of caique transport.

TOTAL £70,000

SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS.

Should the reconnaissance carried out during the first six months prove satisfactory, there will be an increased demand for stores and this will involve the purchase of additional caiques. It is estimated that expenditure will increase by a further £100,000; no breakdown of this figure is possible in this outline plan.

When considering these figures it must be remembered that they are based on speculation and may easily prove to be very inaccurate. Probably an error of over-assessment has occurred.

PERSONNEL
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(Summary)

BRITISH.

<u>H.O.</u>	1 officer for A.W.	(See under Organisation)
<u>Main Base</u> <u>MALTA</u>	2 country section officers 1 operations officer 1 training officer 1 signals officer 2 W/T operators (non commissioned)	} See under Main Base
<u>Advanced</u> <u>Base</u> <u>CORFU</u>	2 country section officers 1 signals officer 2 W/T operators (non commissioned)	
	1 codist, male	

ALBANIAN.

In accordance with the plan outlined in "Method) we shall require to recruit the following Albanian personnel:-

6 group leaders
6 W/T operators for field use
3 W/T operators for Advanced base (Corfu)
2 interpreters, one each for Advanced and Main
base (Malta).

Note: It is considered that the attachment at each base of a trusted Albanian interpreter/advisor is essential to ensure that the activities and reports of field parties can be correctly controlled and assessed.

10 fishermen type handyman for use as stores
personnel and caique crews.

Note: Recruitment of personnel falling under this heading may not be necessary in the initial stages, but will be a definite requirement when the stage is reached involving the supply of weapons in larger quantities.

PREPARATORY ACTION.

The Athen's station should be instructed to earmark suitable Albanian personnel from among the B.K. refugees in Greece and to investigate means for their exfiltration.

Preliminary action can also be taken to select the interpreter/advisors above-mentioned.

ORGANISATION

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To control, direct and maintain the operations envisaged in this plan, it is suggested that the following organisation will be required at H.O.

Initiation and general advisory control shall be the responsibility of A.S.O. working in collaboration with C.C.M.

It will be impossible to add this heavy commitment to the already fully employed "P" section under C.C.M. It is, therefore, proposed that for the purpose of this Albanian plan C.C.M.'s S.O. section, namely, A.W., working under the guidance of A.S.O. shall be responsible for this work. A.W. will, in turn, keep the "P" section fully informed.

It is most probable that the A.W. section will require strengthening in order to undertake this added commitment, and it is for further decision whether it would be of greater value for this added strength to be in the form of a country section officer with experience of Albanian guerilla activity, or in view of the heavy "Q" problems which will arise, the addition should be a "Q" officer.

Fortunately the A.W. section in the person of A.W.1. who has had considerable experience of administering exactly similar activities during the war will require no strengthening on the Admin. side.

It is suggested that while Athens station should be kept fully informed, it shall be used only in support of these operations and that this support will most probably be confined to the initial stages, i.e. assistance in recruitment of Albanians and Greek clearance for the establishment of the advanced base CORFU.

COMMUNICATIONS ORGANISATION.

Although entirely individual communication links are envisaged in this plan the handling of all signals traffic with H.O. will be carried out in accordance with the normal procedure and should present no difficulties.

AVAILABLE PERSONNEL.

We are fortunate in having either immediately available or obtainable at short notice a number of suitable officers who have had experience as B.L.O.s with Albanian guerillas. These officers are:-

- [] - (O/Prop).
- [] . At present with his regiment in Germany but is anxious to re-enter this Service.
- [] - Parliamentary candidate for Preston.
- [] - New entry into this Service. Also fully qualified operational W/T operator.

- [] - Has been used by this Service. Recently returned to this country and has made application for permanent employment.
- [] - Of value in advisory capacity.
- [] - S.O. Germany. Considerable knowledge of Greek Albanian frontier work.
- [] - S.O. M.E. War-time experience in caique flotilla, operating CORFU area.

The following diagram shows the proposed organisation.

